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Abstract 
 
What is it to trust someone? What is it for someone to be trustworthy? These are the two main 
questions that this paper addresses. There are various situations that can be described as ones of 
trust, but this paper considers the issue of trust between individuals. In it, I suggest that trust is 
distinct from reliance or cases where someone asks for something on the expectation that it will 
be done due to the different attitude taken by the trustor. I argue that the trustor takes Holton’s 
‘participant stance’ and this distinguishes trust from reliance. I argue that trustworthiness is 
different from reliability and that an account of trustworthiness cannot be successful whilst 
ignoring the point that aligning trustworthiness with reliability removes the virtue from being 
trustworthy. On the question of what it is distinguishes trustworthiness from reliability, I argue 
that the distinction is in the opportunity for the trustee to act against the wishes of the trustor and 
the trustee’s consideration of the value of the trust that has been placed in them by the trustor. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Various theories have been formulated attempting to account for what, if anything, distinguishes 
trusting relationships from other types of relationships. In the background to this issue hover 
questions of good will and motivations and whether or not these are factors that are part of the 
conditions for a trusting relationship. In everyday life we often talk about trust, trustworthiness 
and trusting relationships but what constitutes a trusting relationship remains difficult to define 
in isolation. Part of the problem is the fact that there are a number of different contexts that trust 
can be used in, between individuals, groups and combinations of these. In this paper I focus on 
trust and trustworthiness between individuals. 
 
The questions that this paper addresses are ‘What is it to say that a certain person trusts 
somebody else?’ and ‘What does it mean to say that someone is trustworthy?’ I formulate my 
own answers to these two questions and demonstrating how they are immune to common 
criticisms of other accounts. The way that I do this is by using the participant stance described by 
Holton in my account of trust and a requirement that the trustee factor in the value of a trusting 
relationship in my definition of what makes someone trustworthy, which maintains the status of 
trustworthiness as something that is objectively desirable or virtuous. 
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The question then that I wish to consider to begin with is ‘What does it mean to say of two 
individuals, P and Q, that “P trusts Q?”’ In order to answer this question effectively, it is 
important to identify that there are two types of situation where the statement would be true. On 
the one hand there are cases where P is trusting Q with something specific and on the other hand 
there are cases where P is not trusting Q with something specific but can be said to trust Q in a 
more general sense. As these types of situations are different, the conditions that I argue are 
necessary for each them to be true must reflect this difference. 
 
 
1. The participant stance, good will and expectations 
 
My account of the necessary and sufficient conditions for trust in both types of scenario involves 
the use of what Richard Holton (1994) refers to as the participant stance. In order to understand 
my account effectively, it will first be necessary to get an idea of what the participant stance 
involves and specifically the role that it plays in accounts of trust. This is important because it is 
one of the central conditions that (in my account) help to mark out trust from other attitudes such 
as reliance or dependence. 
 
Holton considers the participant stance to be the thing that makes the difference between cases of 
reliance and cases of trust (Holton, 1994, p 67). The participant stance is an attitude that is 
adopted by the trustor toward the trustee. When we invest trust in somebody, we adopt the 
participant stance towards them, whereas when we rely on something to work, such as the 
refrigerator to remain cool whilst we are out, we do not adopt the participant stance. The 
difference is that when we invest trust in someone, unlike the refrigerator we prepare ourselves 
to feel either gratified should they do as we have trusted them to or else betrayed by them in the 
event of them not acting as we have trusted them to. In the event of the refrigerator failing whilst 
we are out, ruining our milk, yoghurts etc. we may feel disappointment or even anger but we do 
not feel that the refrigerator has somehow betrayed us. This is because we rely on the refrigerator 
rather than trusting in it. The possibility of being made to feel gratified or betrayed as a result of 
adopting the participant stance is something that I will come back to when I compare the 
participant stance to a simple attitude of expectation. 
 
I agree with Holton that this participant stance is important for identifying examples of trusting 
relationships and being able to tell them apart from examples of relationships of reliance. Adding 
the participant stance as a condition for trust into an account of what trust is raises the status of 
trust. It does this because it means that there is more at stake than there is in reliance- the feeling 
that someone has actively betrayed you by breaching your trust creates a more powerful negative 
feeling than finding out that something has not happened when you thought it was going to.  
Likewise finding that someone has done something that you trusted them to do creates a stronger 
sense of gratification than finding out that something that you were relying on has worked out for 
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you. This added disappointment or gratification is what raises the stakes in cases of trust as there 
will be more of a response to the actions of the trustee by the trustor. These raised stakes give 
trust the separate status of being something more than reliance that I think any descriptive 
account of trust needs to consider. Due to the fact that it means that there is more invested, the 
participant stance is not only useful but a necessary condition for accounts of trust since without 
it, the situation resembles one of mere reliance. 
 
The requirement for the participant stance for trust is not something that all authors in the 
literature agree on. A prominent alternative to the participant stance in accounts of the necessary 
conditions for trust is the presence of some form of goodwill in the situation, as Annette Baier 
argues in her characterisation of trust (Baier, 1986, p.235). The presence of goodwill and the 
participant stance perform the same function of elevating the status of trust above reliance by 
raising what is dependent on the outcome but I take the participant stance to be more effective 
and less problematic choice for reasons I demonstrate later. For now, suffice to say that in my 
account the participant stance plays the role of elevating cases of trust to a status with more at 
stake than cases of reliance and I believe that this is the best way of achieving this. 
 
What distinguishes the attitude of the participant stance from an attitude of expectation? I have 
presented the participant stance as an attitude that leaves the trustor feeling betrayed if their 
trustee does not act as they would hope or like, but relying on someone with the expectation that 
they will do what the trustor* hopes or would like them to do also allows the trustor* to feel 
betrayed in the event of the trustee* not complying.1
                                                          
1 Where I have referred to the trustor* (with an asterisk) I have included an asterisk to show that they are the 
equivalent to the trustor. Since the case is not one of trust, I do not believe that they really are trustors, but I have 
used this to identify them as the equivalent in a different situation. The equivalent here applies where I have referred 
to the trustee*. 
 What enables us to distinguish the 
participant stance from a stance of expectation is the response in the event of the trustee not 
doing as they have been trusted to do. When a trustor adopts the participant stance and the trustee 
complies, there is a feeling of gratification on the part of the trustor at the trustee having done as 
the trustor has asked of them. Consider this against a situation where a trustor* asks a trustee* to 
do something and expects that they will do so. If the trustee* acts as they were asked to, it seems 
less likely that the trustor* will feel gratified by the trustee* doing as they were expected to. 
When a trustor adopts the participant stance towards a trustee and the trustee complies, then the 
trustor feels gratified, but if the trustee does not comply, the trustor feels betrayed. When the 
trustor* expects the trustee* to comply and the trustee* complies, the trustor* does not feel 
gratified, but if the trustee* does not comply, then the trustor* has feelings of betrayal. This is 
what I take to be the main difference between the participant stance and expectation. The 
participant stance is different from expecting a certain outcome since it is a stance without 
expectation that leaves the individual prepared to feel either betrayed or gratified, rather than 
betrayed or just satisfied that things have happened as expected. For this reason, I believe it is 
superior to expectation. 
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2. An account of trust 
 
In the introduction I distinguished between ‘P trusts Q with something’ and ‘P trust Q in general, 
though not with anything specific at the moment’ and stated that ‘P trusts Q’ could refer to either 
one. These are what I think are the necessary and sufficient conditions for the statement ‘P trusts 
Q with something’ to be true: 
 
1. P requires/requests something of Q. 
2. P takes the participant stance described by Holton (Holton, 1994, p. 67). 
3. P believes that Q’s response will influence the situation. 
4. P believes that Q is freely capable of choosing to do or not do as P would like. 
5. P believes that Q believes they are being trusted or has access to evidence permitting them to 
reasonably form the belief. 
 
This account is specifically for cases where P and Q represent individuals. The case for groups I 
take to be more complicated as there are questions of whether or not all of the individuals in each 
group need to fulfil all the conditions in order for a situation to be one of trust, for example not 
all of the members of the group that is being trusted may be free to choose whether or not to do 
as the trustor(s) would like- they may be committed to going along with a majority decision for 
example. Here, under my characterisation it might appear as if the trustor(s) are simultaneously 
trusting some members of the group and not trusting others, something that I do not think is 
possible. 
 
The implications that this has for the issue of what it is for one group trusts another (in either 
sense) is opaque and I do not intend the theory I have given to necessarily apply to groups. For 
reasons of space I cannot examine this more fully than to state that what this demonstrates 
however is there can be different accounts of what constitutes trust in different situations. 
 
My conditions referred to cases where P trusted Q with something specifically, but as I 
mentioned saying that ‘P trusts Q’ can have another meaning. It can mean that P is not currently 
trusting Q with anything but still trusts Q in a general sense. If the ‘P is currently trusting Q with 
something’ situation is false but the ‘P trusts Q in general’ situation is true, then I believe the 
conditions for this are as follows: 
 
1. P would be prepared to require/request something from Q in certain circumstances. 
2. P would adopt the participant stance as a result. 
3. That which P required or requested would satisfy the other conditions for ‘P trusts Q with 
something’ as listed above. 
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If my conditions for ‘P trusts Q with something’ hold, then I see the conditions for ‘P trusts Q in 
general’ as relatively uncontroversial as they are all derived from the first set. The motivations 
for the second set of conditions are intrinsically linked to the motivations for the first. 
 
I claimed in my first characterisation that P must believe that Q’s response will somehow be 
influential in the outcome of the situation. This is because if P does not believe that Q’s response 
will influence the situation, then P cannot reasonably adopt the participant stance and as a result 
condition 2 cannot be fulfilled. For example, if P wants to trust Q not to tell S something because 
P believes that it will upset S then P can only do so if he believes Q would be able to tell S. P 
cannot (for example) trust Q not to tell S something if he believes S is dead. This is because P 
would not adopt the participant stance- he would not be disappointed if Q betrayed him, it is 
more likely that he would be amazed he succeeded. P can however trust Q not to tell S if P 
believes S to be alive but S is actually dead because P believes that Q can betray him and 
consequently adopts the participant stance. Importantly here it does not matter whether or not P 
is mistaken about believing that Q will be able to influence the situation; we can say that ‘P trusts 
Q with something’ because when the trust was being invested, P believed that Q would be able to 
influence the outcome as a result of his decision. 
 
To demonstrate further how my characterisation of trust differs from others, I will explain some 
common features of other characterisations that mine does not include and also why I do not 
believe they are necessary where other authors do. My set of conditions is small compared to 
others in the literature so in order to distinguish my account from others I deal primarily with 
conditions that others believe are necessary for trust that I do not. 
 
1. I see no reason for an account to include goodwill as Baier suggests, or even the absence of ill 
will as I mentioned (Baier, 1986, p. 235).2 I stated in my overview of the participant stance that I 
consider the participant stance to be preferable to the requirement for either goodwill or no ill 
will to elevate the status of trust beyond reliance. The reasons for this are akin to those put 
forward by Holton’s counterexample. Holton presents an example of two armies who may not 
only a lack of goodwill towards each other but even have active ill will but we still say that one 
trusts another when one raises a white flag and trusts the other not to shoot them (Holton, 1994, 
p. 65).3
                                                          
2 Baier’s paper only accounts for goodwill rather than a lack of ill will. 
 I agree with Holton that this is a trusting situation and there is clearly no goodwill in the 
picture, which means that goodwill is not a necessary condition for trust. The same cannot be 
said about the participant stance. The side that holds up the white flag may adopt the participant 
stance towards the other and feel betrayed should their trustees shoot them. The primary 
attraction then of the participant stance is that it allows us to include examples like this one, 
3  The example Holton uses involves opposing armies, which obviously involves groups rather than individuals, but 
I believe that in this case the difference does not matter. 
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which appear to be the kind of thing that we would want to include as an example of trust, 
whereas an account that demanded either good will as Baier does, or a weaker version 
demanding a lack of ill-will explored by Holton, cannot classify this as trust, demonstrating the 
superiority of the participant stance as the criterion for setting trust above reliance. 
 
2. I also do not think that for P to be trusting Q that P needs to be more vulnerable than the 
vulnerability that is entailed by the participant stance. Annette Baier promotes the view that for a 
relationship to be a trusting one vulnerability on the part of the trustor is needed by observing 
that the trustor depends on the trustee’s actions and is consequently vulnerable (Baier, 1986, p. 
235). Baier considers the vulnerability to be linked to the goodwill of the individual however and 
this I believe is a mistake. In the following example I demonstrate that there can be cases of 
trusting relationships where there is no vulnerability beyond the consequences of the participant 
stance. By this I mean that the trustee’s actions may not actually influence the situation even 
though the trustor must believe that they will and the situation still is one of trust. In short, the 
trustor’s belief that they are vulnerable may be mistaken and the relationship still justly 
considered trusting. Consider this case: 
 
P trusts Q not to tell S that P will not be going to his party because he fears S may become angry. 
Q chooses to betray P’s trust and divulges the information to S. Rather than reacting as P 
expected, S chooses to not believe Q, believing that Q is either lying or mistaken. This example 
is a case where P was never any more vulnerable than the participant stance made necessary and 
he may now feel justifiably betrayed but we can still say that P trusted Q. This shows that we can 
have examples of trust with no more vulnerability than the participant stance entails. 
 
3. I have already stated that my account of trust does not require P to have expectations about 
how Q will respond to his trust. My requirements are for P to believe that Q’s response will 
affect P’s situation and for P to believe that Q is free to choose whether to do as P wants him to 
do or otherwise. This makes my account distinct from that of Karen Jones who holds that trust 
requires both affective optimism and an expectation of the trustee (Jones, 1996, p. 8). Jones says 
that in order for a trustor to trust someone, the trustor needs to have expectations of the trustee 
even if it is not necessarily an expectation of performance otherwise the trustor would be 
unlikely to trust (Jones, 1996, p. 8). My view is that trust does not need either affective optimism 
or expectation and that demanding these is problematic because it means that a number of cases 
that we would want to consider trusting cannot be considered trusting because they do not meet 
these conditions. This applies to an example I have previously given regarding the white flags in 
Holton’s paper (Holton, 1994, p. 65). We want to consider this as a case of trust but what if the 
side holding up the white flag is fighting an army whose culture they have limited knowledge of. 
This means that they would not be able to have any expectation about how their adversaries 
would respond to the white flag, but they may still adopt the participant stance and the situation 
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is still one that we would want to call trusting. I believe that the participant stance is a better 
reflection of the attitude than one of expectation. 
 
Oswald Hanfling describes a ‘natural inclination’ to promise keeping that might affect how the 
armies operate with respect to trusting (Hanfling, 2008, p. 164). This kind of natural inclination 
is compatible with my view that there does not need to be any expectation because the natural 
inclination to trust people is not dependent on expecting that people will do as they are being 
trusted to. A natural inclination is even attractive for my account because it allows P to trust Q 
even when P has neither a belief about what Q will do as a result of P trusting them nor any 
evidence on which to base such a belief. 
 
 
3. Trustworthiness 
 
Russell Hardin (1996) argues that when philosophers attempt to consider trust, often they 
inadvertently consider trustworthiness, mistaking it for trust (Hardin, 1996, p. 28). His account of 
trustworthiness is distinctive and I will use it here to juxtapose against my own as they differ on 
a number of points. In this section I will a.) Give an account of the main points of Hardin’s 
characterisation and why he develops his account of trustworthiness as he does and b.) Set out 
my own views on trustworthiness and explain both how it differs from Hardin’s and where it fits 
into the wider literature on the subject. I also aim to show why it is preferable to others on offer 
elsewhere. Jones (forthcoming) argues that from any account of trust, it is possible to see the 
author’s view about trustworthiness as one leads to the other (Jones, forthcoming, p. 1). I have 
given my account of trust and Jones’ claim holds true for my characterisation, in that my 
definition of trustworthiness is dependent on my definition of trust. Once I have outlined my 
account of what it is to be trustworthy, I will demonstrate how it follows from my previously 
articulated account of trust. 
 
 
3a. Hardin’s characterisation of trustworthiness 
 
Hardin argues the trustworthiness of an individual can be increased or decreased by aspects such 
as institutional backing and formal contracts that help remove the risk from cooperative 
situations (Hardin, 1996, pp. 31-2). By the trustor taking precautions to shut down the possibility 
that the trustee will not act as they want, Hardin thinks that the trustor becomes able to invest 
more trust as a result of the trustee becoming increasingly trustworthy. The trustor would trust 
the trustee with more because they know that the chances of the trustee not doing as they would 
like are increasingly slim due to the repercussions that would take place. 
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Essentially, according to Hardin’s theory, as the opportunity for the trustee to act against the 
wishes of the trustor decreases, the trustworthiness of the trustee increases. Hardin’s theory is 
underpinned by a belief that if people are trustworthy, they will do what we want them to. This 
explains the correlation between the social mechanisms put into place to restrict the trustee, the 
security of the trustor’s investment and the trustworthiness of an individual. Hardin believes that 
trustworthiness can be increased by social contracts and sanctions because he aligns being 
trustworthy with doing what the trustor wants. Because contracts and other mechanisms make it 
more likely that the trustee will behave as the trustor wants, trustworthiness is increased by these 
means in Hardin’s view. Hardin’s view simplifies trustworthiness to the point that 
trustworthiness is simply compliance. Hardin’s account therefore presents the most trustworthy 
people as the ones who will simply always do as we want. 
 
 
3b. An alternative account of what it is to be trustworthy 
 
My own account of what it is for someone to be trustworthy is considerably different to 
Hardin’s. To formalise my view, here are what I take to be the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for ‘Q is trustworthy’ to be true: 
 
1. Q acknowledges the value of the trust that is invested in them. 
2. Q uses this to help rationally decide how to act. 
 
My representation of trustworthiness is very different to Hardin’s and is actually quite close to 
the view of Karen Jones, who demands that the trustee must consider the expectation of the 
trustor and use this as their primary motivation in order to be trustworthy (rather than reliable) 
when they decide how to act (Jones, 1996, p. 6). Unlike Jones however, my characterisation 
requires the trustee only to consider the value of the trusting relationship that is at stake rather 
than the specific expectation of the trustor. It could be said that this view leads to a problem 
concerning selfishness for my view but I do not believe that this is so. Importantly, where I have 
set a requirement for the trustee to consider the ‘value of the trust’ this does not mean that they 
must accept my definition of trust necessarily, just that they ought to take a view of trust that 
accounts for trust as something more valuable than simply reliance in order to consider it 
properly against other things. 
 
I have previously stated that I share Jones’ belief about the fact that accounts of what it is to be 
trustworthy following on from accounts of what it is to trust someone. My account of what it is 
to be trustworthy follows from what it is to trust someone because when I accounted for trust, I 
was careful to distinguish it from examples of expectation or reliance, arguing that trust had a 
higher value than either of these. My account of trustworthiness also maintains the distinction 
between cases of trust and reliance, distinguishing between being reliable or corresponding with 
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expectations and being trustworthy. The key link between my account of trust and my account of 
trustworthiness is the trustee’s ability to freely choose whether or not to disregard the trust that 
has been invested in them. 
 
Because I have set up a characterisation that for Q to be trustworthy all that Q has to do is 
appropriately value his trustor’s trust in him and decide how to act accordingly, one possible 
objection might be that if Q was such a selfish person that they recognised that P was trusting 
them to do something that might not be in Q’s own interests but after weighing everything up 
decided that they did not want to do as P asked them to then they could prove themselves to be 
(under my account) trustworthy, but we would generally want to say that in such a case Q has 
not demonstrated trustworthiness at all.4 An example of this might be where P runs a small 
factory that needs someone present in order to operate safely and effectively and P trusts Q to 
run the factory for him for a short period of time as P will be taken into hospital for an operation 
but Q decides that actually he would rather stay in bed for the days P is in hospital rather than 
run the factory.5
 
 It appears that this presents a problem both for me and also Jones, given that her 
view required the trustee to consider the expectations of the trustor, the trustee could do this and 
still act in a selfish way. 
If the reason for us our desire to say that Q has not been trustworthy can be put down to intuition, 
then I am inclined to say that intuition is not mistaken in this instance. I too share the view that 
we are right to say that Q has not been trustworthy but I do feel that this can be accommodated 
within the view that I have expressed. In cases such as the selfish one, I think that by prioritising 
his own selfish interest, Q has not fulfilled the requirement of acknowledging the value of the 
trust placed in him, part of clause 1 of my account. The reason for this is that I think that for him 
to be considering the value of the trusting relationship appropriately (and therefore being 
trustworthy under my account) Q must consider the trusting relationship appropriately in relation 
to other motivations. By arriving at a conclusion that it seems that no rational person would end 
up at- that lazy self interest would be more valuable than or should take priority over a trusting 
relationship, I think that Q has set himself up for the charge of not considering the value of the 
trust properly. What I have proposed here does not require an alignment of trustworthiness with 
acting in the way that someone would like you to. It is still possible to be trustworthy in this case 
but also not do as the trustor would like you to. If Q decided that he would not operate P’s 
factory whilst he was away because he did not feel that he was appropriately qualified to do so 
without risking his own life, then Q could still be trustworthy without doing as P asked. Hardin 
does not allow for the possibility that Q can be trustworthy but not do as his trustor says. This 
important characteristic, which is the quintessential feature that separates my account from 
Hardin’s I think also helps me evade a problem for Hardin, which I will come back to after 
                                                          
4 This example was first suggested to me by Professor Stephen Laurence, University of Sheffield. 
5 The example here has been adapted from Edward H. Lorenz, „Subcontracting in the French Industry‟ in Diego 
Gambetta (ed.) Trust: Making and Breaking Co-operative Relations (Oxford, 1988) p. 196. 
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considering Jones’ response to the challenge of the selfish individual, which I take to be less 
effective than mine. Jones is affected by the problem of the selfish individual in a similar way to 
me; the only difference being that where I have stated that Q must consider the value of the trust 
properly, Jones argues that Q must consider the fact that P is counting on them when making his 
decision. The problem of the selfish person still stands against Jones as it is possible that if Q 
were a selfish person then it is quite possible that he might consider the fact that P is counting on 
them but decide that they are such a selfish person that they would prioritise their own interests 
over P’s needs despite the fact that P was counting on them. Jones gets around this problem by 
saying that Q must not only consider that P is counting on them but also consider the fact that P 
is counting on them as a compelling reason to act in order to be trustworthy.6
 
 
In summary, if I do what you want without any consideration of what you might expect of me, I 
am reliable but I am not trustworthy. In order to be trustworthy I must act because you are 
counting on me and I believe the fact that you are counting on me to be a compelling reason to 
act according to Jones. 
 
The reason that I find this unsatisfactory is that this response can lead Jones to a position similar 
to the one that Hardin is in, in that she demands compliance in order for someone to be 
trustworthy, in Jones’ case being motivated by the fact that someone is trusting them. If someone 
being trustworthy means that they take the fact that someone is trusting them to be a reason that 
compels them to do whatever they are being trusted to do then trustworthiness is associated for 
Jones with compliance. If Jones associates trustworthiness with acting as a trustor would like 
then her view of trustworthiness becomes similar to Hardin’s view that being trustworthy is 
doing what someone has trusted you to do. The reason that I believe that Jones’ view becomes 
closer to Hardin’s is because their end products become the same (compliance) and it is just the 
method of getting there that differs. I will now demonstrate why views that link trustworthiness 
with compliance, which I refer to as compliance views, are unsatisfactory: 
 
Compliance views have a problem when two different people trust someone to do two 
conflicting things.7
                                                          
6 This is not taken from Jones’ paper, but I am grateful for Karen‟s comments in responding to the challenge of 
 Suppose P says to Q ‘I trust you not to steal from me under any 
circumstances’ and later Q’s partner says to Q ‘We have no money and are starving so if the 
opportunity arises I trust you to steal from anyone, including P since I need you to.’ If the 
opportunity to steal from P were to arise it looks like under compliance views of what it is to be 
trustworthy, Q has to be both trustworthy and not trustworthy. He cannot both steal from P and 
simultaneously not steal from P so he must either not act as P would like him to or not act as his 
the selfish individual. 
7 If Jones holds a view that trustworthiness is connected to compliance then I believe that she also has this problem 
as it is a problem for theories in general that conflate trustworthiness and compliance. 
 
11 | P a g e  
 
partner would like him to, making him both trustworthy from the point of view of one and 
untrustworthy from the point of the other. 
 
Under Hardin’s characterisation then it follows that whatever Q does he must be both 
trustworthy and not trustworthy at the same time. The only way that I think Hardin can 
accommodate this is by stating that someone’s trustworthiness is relative to their situation. In this 
situation from P’s perspective Q might be trustworthy but from Q’s partner’s perspective Q 
might not be trustworthy. This relativist view puts Hardin in a position where he can explain how 
Q can be simultaneously trustworthy and not trustworthy. I believe that this is the only way in 
which Hardin can accommodate this idea of being trustworthy and not trustworthy at the same 
time, but I also believe that this view remains less attractive than my view because if he holds it, 
it commits Hardin to the following problem: 
 
By linking trustworthiness to being reliable, Hardin seems to commit to the view that we can be 
trustworthy on some occasions and not trustworthy on other occasions or even trustworthy and 
not trustworthy at the same time if he takes the relativist stance that I have ascribed to him. 
Using my view, where for us to be trustworthy we have to rationally evaluate the value of a 
trusting relationship against our other motivations means that we either do this or do not and are 
trustworthy or not trustworthy depending on our actions. In the example given above where there 
are two conflicting cases of trust imposed upon Q, if Q factors in the value of a trusting 
relationship with both people and decides rationally based upon this then he is being trustworthy 
towards both people even if he acts against the wishes of one of them. If Q’s thoughts go 
something like ‘I know that P trusts me not to steal from him but if I do not I will die and so will 
my family so in this case I must do what P trusts me not to do and steal from him’ then I 
maintain that Q is still behaving in a trustworthy way toward P despite not acting as P would like 
him to because it looks like Q takes an appropriate course of action for someone worthy of being 
described as trustworthy. My view maintains the normative status of trustworthiness that Hardin 
has to sacrifice to make trustworthiness relative. 
 
My view also shares similar features with that of Paul Faulkner who implicitly stands against 
Hardin when he says that when there are other motivations (examples of these might be the 
contracts and sanctions that Hardin describes) this creates a tension for cases that would 
otherwise be cases of trust (Faulkner, 2007, p. 305). I agree with this view because I think that 
when other measures such as contracts and sanctions are put into place, it bears a closer 
resemblance to reliability rather than trust as the opportunity to act against the wishes of the 
trustor become reduced. As a part of my conditions for trust, I featured the opportunity for the 
trustee to choose not to do as the trustor would like. When this condition is not met, it follows 
that I think that the situation is no longer one of trust. The distinction between trust and reliance 
is important, as we consider trusting relationships to be something more than simply reliance 
relationships and the view that Faulkner and I both hold works better than Hardin’s view because 
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it allows us to distinguish between relationships of trust and relationships of reliance in a way 
that Hardin does not. Phillip Pettit raises the point that whilst there is free will for the trustee 
there is still trust as the trustee can choose to act against the trustor but this is still compatible 
with my claim that the trust is diluted when there are other restrictive measures in place (Pettit, 
1995, pp. 207-8). My characterisation required the trustee to be able to freely choose and as a 
result Pettit’s claim that as long as the trustee has free will then they are in a trusting relationship 
(so long as the situation meets my other conditions) is compatible with my argument. 
 
It certainly becomes less obvious that we can recognise a case of trust as the external pressures 
are increased. When we can see that there are other things that could motivate a trustee to 
comply, it is less evident that their action is as a result of them considering the value of a trusting 
relationship. Whilst it does not rule out the possibility that the trustee has acted in the way that I 
prescribe for trustworthiness, it does make it very difficult to know for sure. Cases where we can 
see that someone has acted in a trustworthy manner seem to be preferable to cases where we 
cannot say for certain whether or not someone has been trustworthy in much the same way that 
knowledge in general is preferable to mere belief or estimation. If we can know about someone’s 
trustworthiness then we can decide how best to act in the future rather than being uncertain about 
how to proceed as we have only guessed about their motives. 
 
Because of the way that Hardin presents trustworthiness as compliance, it follows from his 
argument that being trustworthy can be something that can be good or bad in different situations.  
The fact that he connects trustworthiness with doing as the trustor would like means that there 
are times where it would be good to be untrustworthy and times where being trustworthy might 
be a bad thing. For example, where P trusts Q to steal from the already impoverished S despite P 
and Q both being rich it might be a good thing for Q to be untrustworthy. This demonstrates my 
earlier point about Hardin’s relativity removing the normative status of trustworthiness as a 
virtue. My characterisation of trustworthiness aligns trustworthiness with rational action, 
establishing it as a virtue; which seems more closely in line with how we generally regard it. 
When we say that someone is trustworthy, we are also stating that they have some desirable 
quality. This goes some way towards explaining why honest people as well as confidence 
tricksters typically desire to be regarded as trustworthy (using my account). If trustworthiness 
were simply compliance as Hardin characterises it, then people would not want to be seen as 
trustworthy so much because it would mean that they were simply predictable and likely to 
comply when they ought not to. Being predictable opens an individual up to exploitation more 
than being someone who rationally values a trusting relationship as are easier to exploit as their 
actions are easy to plan for. Because my characterisation of trustworthiness corresponds better 
with the fact that individuals seek to be perceived as trustworthy by others than Hardin’s, it 
seems to be a more effective account at describing what it is for someone to be trustworthy than 
Hardin’s. 
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To end, I would like to make a few remarks that draw together what I have been considering. I 
have shown that theories of trust and trustworthiness do not require a number of features that 
other authors within the literature believe need to be contained within them. There is no need for 
goodwill in theories of trust, although it may be a good thing to have present in a situation, but a 
participant stance takes its place giving trust the status above reliance that we generally want it to 
have, as this helps us explain by our feelings of betrayal when our trust is breached rather than 
mere disappointment when we rely on something that does not work out. Trustworthiness should 
not be connected with compliance because if it is then we are in a position where trustworthiness 
can lose its value as a virtue that we prize in others as individuals since they can somehow be 
both trustworthy and not trustworthy at the same time and there can also be situations where they 
ought not to be trustworthy. I have suggested that we replace this with a conception of 
trustworthiness as a rational response to being trusted. This maintains this status of 
trustworthiness that allows us to regard it as a desirable characteristic. This change in the status 
of trustworthiness means that the trustor increasing external pressures on someone does not have 
the effect of making them more trustworthy, rather it actually has the outcome of obscuring their 
motives, which means that it is harder to tell how they have responded to the trust and 
consequently whether or not they are actually being trustworthy. 
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